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AOn Susan Moller Okin’s “Reason and
Feeling in Thinking about Justice”*
Alison M. Jaggar
I. OKIN’S GOALS
Okin’s article focuses on the original position, which she considers to be
Rawls’s “most important contribution to moral and political theory” ð238Þ.
Thinking from the original position is a method of philosophical reason-
ing intended to explain and justify our sense of justice. Philosophers
using the method imagine ourselves among several parties meeting to
discuss the fundamental and permanent principles of justice that will reg-
ulate our future society. The parties meet behind a “veil of ignorance,”
which conceals particulars of our own situations and those of others.
Rawls’s characterization of the original position is intended to ensure
that the principles agreed on are freely accepted, impartial, and sustain-
able. Okin’s discussion of his method has two aims. First, she re-reads the
original position to show that it can withstand several criticisms influ-
ential among feminists in the 1980s. Second, she argues that, if some
modifications are made to Rawls’s account, original position reasoning
is a valuable method for developing an “acceptable” moral and political
theory in a world where “gender is becoming increasingly an indefen-
sible mode of social organization” ð229Þ.
II. DOES OKIN’S RE-READING OF THE ORIGINAL POSITION
SHOW THAT JUSTICE AND CARE ARE COMPATIBLE?
Feminists of the 1980s advanced several lines of criticism against origi-
nal position thinking. Some asserted that it made indefensibly egoistic as-
sumptions about human nature and had little relevance for actual people* A retrospective essay on Susan Moller Okin, “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about
Justice,” Ethics 99 ð1989Þ: 229–49. All unattributed page references are to this article. Work on
this essay was supported by theResearchCouncil ofNorway through its Centres of Excellence
funding scheme, project number 179566/V20.
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Athinking about justice ð230Þ. Some said that the Rawlsian justice tradition
focused too exclusively on rights and rules while neglecting context and
the values of care and concern for particular others ð247Þ. Finally, other
feminists contended that Rawls was overly preoccupied with impartiality
and universality and failed to appreciate otherness and difference ð247–
48Þ. The common thread that Okin finds in these challenges is the charge
that Rawls over-emphasizes abstract reason and neglects the moral sig-
nificance of feeling.
Okin argues that these criticisms misunderstand how the original
position works. She believes the critics are misled by Rawls’s Kantian rep-
resentation of original position thinking as a branch of rational choice
theory, even though Rawls later said this representation was a “very mis-
leading” error. Okin intends her reinterpretation of the original position
to demonstrate that, “at its center, ðthough frequently obscured by Rawls
himselfÞ is a voice of responsibility, care, and concern for others” ð230Þ.ll use 1. First, although the parties in the original position seek to max-
imize their shares of the “primary social goods,” this does not
commit Rawls to assuming that human nature is egoistic. The
assumption of mutual disinterest has to be taken together with
the veil of ignorance, which “is such a demanding stipulation
that it converts what would, without it, be self-interest into be-
nevolence or equal concern for others” ð244Þ.
2. Second, since the original position is a thought experiment
undertaken by philosophers who really do know their own in-
terests, opting to use the method demonstrates willingness to
abandon egoistic thinking. Using original position thinking re-
flects “a great commitment to benevolence; to caring about
each and every other as much as about ourselves” ð246; italics
in originalÞ.
3. Third, it is only behind the veil of ignorance that the parties
are indistinguishable. Once the veil is removed, they are “per-
sons of all different imaginable types and in all different imag-
inable social positions” ð244Þ. Therefore, Okin argues, “the orig-
inal position is not an abstraction from all contingencies of
human life. . . . It is . . . much closer to an appreciation and
concern for social and other human differences.” ð245; italics in
originalÞ.
4. Finally, philosophers using the method “must think from per-
spective of everybody, in the sense of each in turn” ð244; italics in
originalÞ. This requires us to “develop considerable capacities for
empathy and powers of communicating with others about what
different human lives are like” ð246Þ.This content downloaded from 147.188.108.081 on July 27, 2018 02:15:12 AM
subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Jaggar On Okin’s “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice” 1129
AOkin concludes that the original position is “a theory in which em-
pathy with and care for others, as well as awareness of their differences, are
crucial components” ð248Þ.
Okin’s re-reading of the original position corrects some misun-
derstandings by pointing out both that the method does not assume hu-
man nature to be egoistic and that those using it must care in some way
about others. However, the re-reading fails to show that “one is not forced
to choose between an ethic of justice and an ethic of sympathy or care”
ð238Þ at least in the sense of care used by the feminist theorists Okin cites.
Care theorists such as Gilligan, Noddings, and Blum characterized care
as responsiveness to the directly perceived needs of particular others,
and they contrasted this explicitly with the impersonal and generalized
“love of mankind,” which Rawls says is “continuous” with the “sense of
justice.”1 Okin’s re-reading cannot bridge the gulf between care and jus-
tice thinking posited by 1980s care theorists.
III. DOES THE REVISED ORIGINAL POSITION PROVIDE
A POWERFUL METHOD FOR CHALLENGING
GENDER INJUSTICE?
Although she vigorously defends the original position against several
feminist criticisms, Okin has her own feminist concerns about it. The
main one is Rawls’s unwarranted assumption that the monogamous fam-
ily, citizens’ first school of morality, is itself just. This assumption is built
into Rawls’s characterization of the parties in the original position as “heads
of families,” which means “they are not in a position to settle questions of
justice within families” ð235Þ. Okin therefore revises Rawls’s description of
the original position so that the method can be used to question the justice
of family arrangements. Specifically, she proposes that the “heads of fami-
lies” assumption be discarded, that sex as well as other individual charac-
teristics beplacedbehind the veil of ignorance, and that “the principles of
justice ðbe appliedÞ to the gender structure and the family arrangements
of our society” ð235Þ. In her book, published the same year, Okin asserts
that, with these revisions, the original position is “a powerful concept for
challenging the gender structure.”2
Does Okin’s revision fashion the original position into a power-
ful tool for feminism? The original position is a moral screen through1. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982Þ.
Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education ðBerkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1984Þ. Lawrence Blum, “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for
Moral Theory,” Ethics 98 ð1988Þ: 472–91. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice ðCambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1971Þ, 476.
2. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family ðNew York: Basic, 1989Þ, 109.
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Awhich philosophers filter proposed principles of justice. It is designed
to prevent unjust principles from passing through. Okin’s revision en-
ables the original position to screen out injustices resulting from gen-
dered divisions of household labor, but critics have argued that it fails
to block other aspects of gender injustice which involve class, race, dis-
ability, and sexual orientation.3 These criticisms raise the more general
question of just how much moral work the original position can be ex-
pected to do.
Okin is open to further modifications of the original position,
speaking approvingly of the “interesting critiques” generated by other
philosophers’ “interpreting the original position more radically or broadly
than its creator did” ð238Þ. Taking it to be revisable makes clear that the
original position is simply “a device of representation,”4 which philoso-
phers may adapt to argue for their favored principles. Allowing philoso-
phers to modify the original position turns it into a more flexible meth-
odological tool but weakens the idea that it offers much independent
“critical force” ð238Þ. For instance, thinking from the perspective of the
“least advantaged representative woman” ð245Þ requires categorizing the
infinite variety of human differences intomorally salient gendered groups
or “types” whose disadvantages can be ranked outside any particular con-
text. However, the original position provides no principled way of identi-
fying or ranking such types and so lacks resources to ensure that philoso-
phers using it will not overlook some unjustly disadvantaged groups, as
Rawls did and as Okin is charged with having done.
Why should philosophers choose to represent their thinking about
justice via the original position? Rawls intended the image to organize
multiple moral considerations in a form that would facilitate selecting
justice principles that are both determinate and impartial. In order to
produce a determinate outcome, he thought it was necessary to assume
mutual disinterest together with the veil of ignorance; if benevolence
plus full knowledge were assumed, the situation would be “so complex
that no definite theory at all can be worked out.”5 However, the seem-
ing “simplicity and clarity” of Rawls’s account disappear once Okin
makes explicit that reasoning from the original position requires philos-
ophers to think from the perspectives “of persons of all different imag-
inable types and in all different imaginable social positions” ð244Þ. AsOkin3. Will Kymlicka, “Rethinking the Family,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 ð1991Þ: 177–
97. Eva Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency ðNew York: Routledge,
1998Þ.
4. John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 14 ð1985Þ: 223–51, 237.
5. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 148–49.
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Aacknowledges, this is “far from a simple demand” ð244Þ and indeed is so
challenging that it brings into question the practical usability of themethod.
Okin’s discussion is intended to clarify the original position and
demonstrate its critical power for feminism, but her clarification high-
lights the method’s inherent limitations. Okin may have recognized these
limitations during her subsequent fifteen years writing on gender justice,
because her later statements about moral reasoning move continually
away from the spirit of the original position. They increasingly emphasize
the need for empirical as opposed to hypothetical discourse and themoral
relevance of agents’ specific identities.6 Okin never repudiated original po-
sition reasoning, but her later work quietly dropped it.6. Alison M. Jaggar, “Susan Moller Okin and the Challenge of Essentialism,” inToward a
Humanist Justice: The Philosophy of Susan Moller Okin, ed. Rob Reich and Debra Satz ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009Þ.
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